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Arquitectura de seguridad de MERX: como protegemos sus fondos

When a platform handles financial transactions, security is not a feature - it is the foundation everything else sits on. A single vulnerability can destroy user trust permanently. At MERX, security considerations shaped every architectural decision from day one, not as an afterthought bolted on after the fact.

This article details the security architecture of MERX: how funds are protected, how data integrity is maintained, how the system defends against common attack vectors, and the design principles that make the platform resilient.

Principle 1: No Custody of Private Keys

MERX never holds, stores, or has access to your TRON clave privadas. This is a fundamental design decision that eliminates an entire class of attacks.

How It Works

When you use MERX to purchase energy, the delegation happens from the provider's address to your address. MERX orchestrates this transaction but never needs access to your wallet. Your clave privada stays on your device, in your hardware wallet, or wherever you manage it.

The flow:

1. You tell MERX: "Delegate 65,000 energy to TMyAddress"
2. MERX tells the provider: "Delegate 65,000 energy to TMyAddress"
3. The provider delegates from TProviderAddress to TMyAddress
4. MERX verifies the delegation on-chain
5. Your private key was never involved

Why This Matters

If MERX were compromised, attackers could not steal your TRX or tokens because MERX does not have your keys. Compare this with platforms that require you to deposit tokens to a platform-controlled address - those platforms hold your keys (or keys to your funds), creating a punto unico de fallo.

The Treasury Exception

MERX does manage its own treasury address for receiving deposits and processing withdrawals. The treasury clave privada is stored as a Docker secret, accessible only to the treasury-signer service. It is never exposed to the API service, the web frontend, or any other component. More on this isolation below.

Principle 2: Double-Entry Ledger

Every financial operation on MERX creates a paired entrada del libro mayor. This is the same accounting principle used by every bank and financial institution for the last 700 years. It works.

How It Works

Every transaction creates two entries: a debit and a credit. The sum of all debits always equals the sum of all credits. If they do not, something is wrong, and the system detects it immediately.

-- Order payment example
INSERT INTO ledger (account_id, type, amount_sun, direction)
VALUES
  ($user_id, 'ORDER_PAYMENT', 5525000, 'DEBIT'),
  ($provider_settlement, 'ORDER_PAYMENT', 5525000, 'CREDIT');

Immutability

Ledger records are never updated or deleted. If a transaction needs to be reversed (e.g., a refund), a new entrada del libro mayor is created with the opposite direction:

-- Refund: new entries, original entries remain
INSERT INTO ledger (account_id, type, amount_sun, direction, reference_id)
VALUES
  ($user_id, 'REFUND', 5525000, 'CREDIT', $original_order_id),
  ($provider_settlement, 'REFUND', 5525000, 'DEBIT', $original_order_id);

The original debit entry is never modified. The refund credit entry explicitly references the original, creating a complete audit trail.

Why This Matters

If an attacker compromises the application layer and attempts to inflate a user's balance, the entradas del libro mayor will not balance. Regular reconciliation checks detect this immediately:

-- Reconciliation query: should always return 0
SELECT SUM(CASE direction
  WHEN 'DEBIT' THEN amount_sun
  WHEN 'CREDIT' THEN -amount_sun
END) as imbalance
FROM ledger;

Any non-zero result triggers an immediate alert and investigation.

Principle 3: Atomic Balance Operations

Every mutacion de saldo uses SELECT FOR UPDATE to prevent race conditions. This is not optional - it is enforced at the database level.

The Race Condition Problem

Without proper locking, a user with a 10 TRX balance could submit two simultaneous orders for 8 TRX each:

Thread 1: SELECT balance WHERE user_id = 1    -> 10 TRX
Thread 2: SELECT balance WHERE user_id = 1    -> 10 TRX
Thread 1: balance (10) >= order (8)? YES       -> proceed
Thread 2: balance (10) >= order (8)? YES       -> proceed
Thread 1: UPDATE balance = 10 - 8 = 2 TRX
Thread 2: UPDATE balance = 10 - 8 = 2 TRX

Result: User spent 16 TRX with only 10 TRX balance

The Solution

BEGIN;

-- Lock the row - second transaction waits here
SELECT balance_sun FROM accounts
WHERE user_id = $1
FOR UPDATE;

-- Check balance
-- If insufficient: ROLLBACK
-- If sufficient: proceed

UPDATE accounts
SET balance_sun = balance_sun - $order_amount
WHERE user_id = $1
  AND balance_sun >= $order_amount;  -- Double-check in UPDATE

COMMIT;

FOR UPDATE acquires a row-level lock. The second transaction blocks until the first commits or rolls back. After the first transaction commits (reducing balance to 2 TRX), the second transaction reads the updated balance (2 TRX) and correctly rejects the insufficient-funds order.

Principle 4: Input Validation

All inputs are validated with Zod schemas before processing. This includes API requests, webhook payloads, provider responses, and internal service messages.

API Input Validation

const CreateOrderSchema = z.object({
  energy: z.number()
    .int('Energy must be an integer')
    .min(10000, 'Minimum order is 10,000 energy')
    .max(100000000, 'Maximum order is 100,000,000 energy'),

  targetAddress: z.string()
    .regex(/^T[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{33}$/, 'Invalid TRON address format')
    .refine(isValidTronAddress, 'Invalid TRON address checksum'),

  duration: z.enum(['1h', '1d', '3d', '7d', '14d', '30d']),

  maxPrice: z.number()
    .positive()
    .optional(),

  idempotencyKey: z.string()
    .max(255)
    .optional()
});

Every field is typed, bounded, and validated. No raw user input reaches business logic or database queries.

SQL Injection Prevention

All database queries use parameterized statements. String concatenation is never used to build SQL:

// Never this:
const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '${userId}'`;  // SQL injection

// Always this:
const query = 'SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1';
const result = await db.query(query, [userId]);

This is enforced by code review and linting rules. Hay no mechanism for raw SQL string interpolation in the codebase.

TRON Address Validation

TRON addresses are validated at multiple levels:

  1. Format check: must match the TRON address regex (starts with T, 34 characters, base58).
  2. Checksum verification: the address includes a checksum that detects typos.
  3. On-chain verification (optional): confirm the address exists and is activated.

Sending energy to an invalid address wastes resources and cannot be reversed en cadena. Strict validation prevents this.

Principle 5: Service Isolation

MERX runs as a set of isolated Docker containers, each with minimal permissions and no unnecessary access.

Container Architecture

Docker network:
  |
  |-- api           (port 3000, public-facing)
  |-- price-monitor (no external ports)
  |-- order-executor (no external ports)
  |-- ledger        (no external ports)
  |-- treasury-signer (no external ports, Docker secret access)
  |-- deposit-monitor (no external ports)
  |-- withdrawal-executor (no external ports)
  |
  |-- postgresql    (port 5432, internal only)
  |-- redis         (port 6379, internal only)

Key Isolation Properties

Why This Matters

If an attacker compromises the API service (the most exposed component), they cannot:

The blast radius of any single-service compromise is limited by design.

Principle 6: Rate Limiting and Abuse Prevention

API Rate Limits

Every API endpoint has limite de velocidads appropriate to its purpose:

Public endpoints (prices, health):     100 requests/minute
Authenticated reads (orders, balance): 60 requests/minute
Authenticated writes (create order):   30 requests/minute
Withdrawals:                           5 requests/minute

Rate limits are enforced per clave de API, tracked in Redis with sliding windows.

Withdrawal Safeguards

Withdrawals are the highest-risk operation (moving real assets off-platform). Additional safeguards include:

Principle 7: Webhook Security

MERX sends webhook notifications for estado de la orden updates, deposits, and other events. Webhooks are signed with HMAC-SHA256 to prevent forgery.

How HMAC Webhooks Work

1. MERX computes: HMAC-SHA256(webhook_body, your_webhook_secret)
2. MERX includes the signature in the X-Merx-Signature header
3. Your server recomputes the HMAC with the same secret
4. If signatures match: genuine webhook. If not: forged, discard.

Verification in Code

import crypto from 'crypto';

function verifyWebhook(body: string, signature: string, secret: string): boolean {
  const computed = crypto
    .createHmac('sha256', secret)
    .update(body)
    .digest('hex');

  return crypto.timingSafeEqual(
    Buffer.from(signature),
    Buffer.from(computed)
  );
}

Note the use of timingSafeEqual to prevent timing attacks. A naive string comparison (===) would leak information about the correct signature through tiempo de respuesta variations.

Principle 8: Secrets Management

No secret is ever hardcoded in source code. All sensitive values are managed through environment variables and Docker secrets.

Environment Variables

# .env (never committed to git)
DATABASE_URL=postgresql://...
REDIS_URL=redis://...
API_JWT_SECRET=...
WEBHOOK_SIGNING_SECRET=...
TRON_API_KEY=...

Docker Secrets (for High-Sensitivity Values)

The treasury clave privada is too sensitive for environment variables (which can be logged or leaked through process inspection). It is stored as a Docker secret:

# docker-compose.yml
services:
  treasury-signer:
    secrets:
      - treasury_private_key

secrets:
  treasury_private_key:
    file: /run/secrets/treasury_key

Docker secrets are mounted as files inside the container, readable only by the service process. They do not appear in environment variable listings, container inspect output, or logs.

Git Protection

The .gitignore file excludes all sensitive files:

.env
*.key
*.pem
secrets/

This is set up before the first commit, not after.

Monitoring and Incident Response

Automated Alerts

The following conditions trigger immediate alerts:

Audit Logging

Every security-relevant operation is logged with structured data:

{
  "event": "withdrawal_requested",
  "user_id": "usr_abc123",
  "amount_sun": 10000000,
  "destination": "TAddress...",
  "ip": "203.0.113.45",
  "timestamp": "2026-03-30T12:00:00Z"
}

Logs are retained for forensic analysis and compliance. They are append-only and stored separately from application data.

Conclusion

Security at MERX is not a single feature but a set of interlocking principles: no key custody, partida doble accounting, atomic balance operations, strict input validation, service isolation, limite de velocidading, signed webhooks, and proper secrets management. Each principle addresses a specific threat vector, and together they create a defense-in-depth architecture where compromising any single component does not compromise the system.

No system is invulnerable. But by designing security into the architecture from the start - rather than patching it on later - MERX minimizes the attack surface and maximizes the cost an attacker must pay to cause harm.

Review the codigo abierto components: https://github.com/Hovsteder/merx-sdk-js, https://github.com/Hovsteder/merx-sdk-python, https://github.com/Hovsteder/merx-mcp.

Comience a usar MERX en https://merx.exchange.

Este articulo es parte de la serie tecnica de MERX. MERX es el primer exchange de recursos blockchain, construido con la seguridad como requisito fundamental, no como una ocurrencia tardia.

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